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A BITTER INHERITANCE: EAST GERMAN
REAL PROPERTY AND THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S "LAND
REFORM" DECISION OF APRIL 23, 1991
Jonathan J. Doyle*
INTRODUCTION
The reunification of East and West Germany after forty-five years
of painful separation has raised no more thorny or politically explosive
legal questions than those surrounding ownership of land in the for-
mer German Democratic Republic ("G.D.R.").' Immediately after
the cessation of hostilities in World War II, and continuing down to
the dismantling of the Berlin Wall during those extraordinary days in
November 1989, authorities in the G.D.R. carried out a wide variety
of expropriatory measures for both political and economic purposes.
2
The victims of these campaigns frequently suffered imprisonment or
execution as well as loss of all their property. 3 Post-war economic
conditions in the "Soviet Occupied Zone," as the area which would
later become the G.D.R. was called, were so dismal that many citizens
abandoned their possessions and fled to the West even in the absence
of a specific threat to their lives or their interests. In later decades,
individuals applying for permission to leave the G.D.R. were routinely
required to "sell" their property to an "appropriate person" chosen by
local Communist Party functionaries, usually at a price far below its
market value.
4
* Mr. Doyle, currently with Pelzer & Riesenkampff in Frankfurt, Germany, is a member of
the State Bar of Georgia and a 1987 graduate of Vanderbilt Law School. He was the sole Ameri-
can attorney to participate in the German Academic Exchange Service's "Lawyers Program"
during the period of German reunification, 1989-90.
I. Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding real property titles has often been cited as the chief
impediment to the private investment critically required for economic recovery in this part of
Europe. See, e.g., Gerhard Fieberg & Harald Reichenbach, Zum Problem der offenen
Vermogensfragen, 6 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter NJW] 321 (1991) (general over-
view of regulations concerning expropriated property in the former G.D.R. as of Feb. 6, 1991).
The human dimension to these problems has been ably captured in Katie Hafner, The House We
Lived In: Reclaiming Family Property in Eastern Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, § 6 (Maga-
zine) at 32.
2. See infra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
3. See Hans H. von Arnim, Entzug den Grundrechte aus Opportunitat?, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG [hereinafter FAZ], Sept. 6, 1990, at 8.
4. See DDR HANDBUCH 420 (Bundesministerium fir innerdeutsche Beziehungen ed., 1985).
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The inevitable consequence of these measures was a large number
of citizens living in West Germany ("F.R.G."), who, if western legal
concepts prevailed, could make out convincing claims to ownership of
large portions of the G.D.R.5 As political momentum for German
reunification gathered during the early months of 1990, many of these
dispossessed persons, or their heirs, began to entertain hopes of recov-
ering their lands. Simultaneously, East German homeowners anx-
iously awaited the arrival of some proverbially-rich "Westie" who,
flashing some official-looking papers, would peremptorily inform them
that they were trespassers on "his" land. In the commercial arena,
western firms witnessed the collapse of negotiations on a number of
potentially profitable joint ventures with state-owned G.D.R. con-
glomerates when third parties came forward with credible claims to
ownership of the proposed business sites; since a parcel of land was
often the principal asset offered by the East German partner, the po-
tential invalidity of title to that land was often fatal to ongoing negoti-
ations for a joint venture.
Although the Unity Treaty, which West Germany negotiated with
the democratically elected East German government, generally pro-
vides for restitution to the original owners of real property confiscated
by the G.D.R. after 1949, it expressly confirms the continuing validity
of expropriations carried out during the period of Soviet administra-
tion from 1945 to 1949.6 This confirmation was meant, inter alia, to
preserve the system of property ownership established after the tumul-
tuous agricultural revolution known as "land reform." During this
revolution thousands of property owners with holdings in excess of an
arbitrary amount were arrested, deprived of their belongings, and
often imprisoned or deported to labor camps. The Unity Treaty con-
tains additional provisions revising the F.R.G.'s Constitution (the
"Basic Law"), so as to protect these confiscations against any constitu-
tional objection arising out of Basic Law Article 14's property
guarantee. 7
5. By the year 1948 approximately one-third of all agricultural land (including forestry acre-
age) in the Soviet zone had been transferred to state ownership. In 1989 fully 94.5% of such
property was owned by "agricultural production communes" or the government. "Land Re-
form" Decision of Apr. 23, 1991, - BVerfGE - [hereinafter Decision], at A II(1)(b) (advance
copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law). Regarding the legal structure of
the communes, see infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. The drafters of West Germany's 1949 Basic
Law were acutely aware that only the zones occupied by Britain, France, and the United States
would be allowed to ratify the document and become part of the Federal Republic. To empha-
size their conviction that they were not founding a new state, but merely reorganizing part of the
"German Empire" until such time as all Germans would be free to adopt a new constitution,
Summer 1992]
Michigan Journal of International Law
As expected, the failure of the Unity Treaty's drafters to redress
land expropriations occurring between 1945 and 1949 elicited a storm
of protest from the substantial number of Germans whose pre-war
property the Bonn government appeared to be so carelessly "giving
away." 8 The constitutionality of the Unity Treaty was questioned on a
number of grounds. A flood of litigation ensued, and, after what was
called "the most dramatic oral argument ever conducted before the
Supreme Constitutional Court,"9 the Court rendered its controversial
opinion of April 23, 1991.10 This historic decision could have far-
reaching and unintended effects on the German law of property, on
the law of asylum, and on the rights of foreigners in Germany. This
article briefly examines the principal expropriatory measures under-
taken between 1945 and 1989, the agreements between the two Ger-
man governments relating thereto, and the divisive constitutional
issues raised by this fusion of two antithetical legal systems in the area
of property law. The text concludes with an analysis of the German
Supreme Court's "Land Reform" decision and the juridical contro-
versy surrounding it.
I. EXPROPRIATION OF REAL PROPERTY" 1945-1989
A. "Nazis and War Criminals"
Shortly after the surrender of Germany at the end of World War
II, the Soviet Military Administration ("SMA") carried out a rapid
sequestration of real property in its occupation zone. According to
SMA Command Nos. 124 of October 30 and 126 of October 31, 1945,
the authorities were to seize all property of: 1) the German govern-
ment; 2) the Nazi party and its leading members; 3) the German mili-
tary command; 4) corporations and partnerships dissolved or
forbidden by the SMA; 5) all citizens of countries allied with Germany
in the war; and 6) "other persons identified by the Soviet Command on
special lists or otherwise."' 2
they titled the document Grundgesetz ("Basic Law") [hereinafter GG], rather than Verfassung
("constitution").
8. See Drohende Verfassungsklage, HANDELSBLATT, Aug. 29, 1990; Enteignete sind ent-
tauscht, FAZ, Sept. 5, 1990, at 2.
9. Letter from Josef Zeller, Esq., Schwarz Schniewind Kelwing Khadjavi, to Jonathan J.
Doyle, Esq. (Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) (author's
translation).
10. Decision, supra note 5.
11. The material in this section is largely adapted from the exhaustive survey found in
Wilhelm Hebing, Enteignung und Rtickerwerb von DDR-Vermo'gen, 45 BETRIEBS-BERATER,
issue 16, supp. 21, pt. 8 (DDR-Rechtsentwicklungen) 1-9 (1990).
12. Reprinted in BESTIMMUNGEN DER DDR zu EIGENTUMSFRAGEN UND ENTEIGNUNGEN
[V/ol. 13:832
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The sequestered property was placed under the administration of a
fiduciary.' 3 The governments of the individual East German federal
states (hereinafter "Lander") later nationalized these assets by specific
legislation or administrative decree, without compensating the original
owners.14 Since this property passed to State ownership free of all en-
cumbrances, the claims of the former owners' secured creditors were
likewise extinguished.' 5
B. "Land Reform"
After August of 1945 the SMA directed and the individual Lander
carried out a program of expropriations aimed at agricultural holdings
of more than 100 hectares (approximately 250 acres). These measures
were implemented without reference to the classification of the owner
under any of the six categories listed above.' 6 Ownership of real es-
tate, buildings, inventories and related businesses was forcibly trans-
ferred to manual laborers, displaced persons, and craftsmen without
compensation to the former title holders. 17 The new "owners" rarely
had the knowledge or expertise to farm these estates at a profit, and
the government soon used their poor economic performance to pres-
sure them to collectivize into "agricultural production communes".
The property interests united in communes were technically retained
by these "new farmers," but could only be inherited, not sold or other-
wise alienated, by them.'
C. Expropriations Between 1949 and 1972
1. Continuation of SMA-Initiated Seizures
Although Article 23 of the G.D.R.'s Constitution of 1949 declared
that fair compensation must be paid in every case of government ex-
propriation, the campaign of outright confiscations begun by the SMA
continued until at least 1952. These measures were particularly di-
[hereinafter BESTIMMUNGEN] 50-53 (Gesamtdeutsches Institut - Bundesanstalt fur
gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben ed., 1971) (author's translation).
13. Hebing, supra note 11, at 2.
14. These enactments are reprinted in Bestimmungen, supra note 12, at 101-105 (Sachsen),
105-109 (Sachsen-Anhalt), 109-13 (Brandenburg), 113-15 (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), 115-19
(ThUringen).
15. Hebing, supra note 11, at 2-3.
16. Id.
17. The owners were routinely directed to leave the county of their residence, often within a
few hours time, taking with them only the barest of necessities. Representatives of families
which had farmed their estates for centuries were thus summarily dispossessed without recourse
to any judicial proceeding. Decision, supra note 5, at A II(l)(a).
18. Hebing, supra note 11, at 2-3.
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rected at those citizens with business relationships to individuals offi-
cially classified as "Nazis or war criminals."' 19
2. Property of Expatriates
The assets of Germans who had left the Soviet Occupied Zone/
G.D.R. without permission of the appropriate authorities were dis-
posed of in various ways over the years. The controlling principle in
all such cases, however, was the legal definition of "flight from the
republic" as a criminal act.
20
Prior to the formation of the G.D.R. in 1949, the governments of
the individual Lander had seized such assets on their own initiative.
In some cases, control of this property was vested in an agent or fidu-
ciary, while in others title passed directly to the State. Fiduciaries
were given broad discretion to deal with these assets. They were, for
example, empowered to sell related personal property at its assessed
value and to deposit the proceeds in a restricted account in the name
of the former owner.
2'
The first uniform national regulation of the legal status of expatri-
ate property was the "Decree Concerning the Securing of Assets" of
July 17, 1952.22 This document declared that property of all persons
who had left the G.D.R. without prior permission of the authorities
was to be seized immediately. Agricultural property was to be dis-
posed of according to "Land Reform" regulations, while other assets
were temporarily placed under the administration of the central gov-
ernment. An order of the State Secretary of the Interior determined
further that property of persons who had left the G.D.R. after June
10, 1953 was to be placed under the administration of: 1) an agent
with full power of attorney chosen by the original owner; 2) an agent
chosen by the State; or 3) in special cases, a fiduciary chosen by the
local county council.
Order No. 2 of August 20, 1958 adopted the "special case" as the
rule, allowing in principle only state-controlled fiduciaries to adminis-
ter seized property. 23 Although title technically remained in the expa-
triate, this amounted to de facto expropriation, since the former owner
19. Id. at 3.
20. The highest court of the G.D.R. went so far as to declare that the very act of leaving the
country without official permission was itself sufficient to effect a transfer of title to "people's
ownership," without the need for a formal government proceeding. Id. at 3 n. 15.
21. Id. at 3.
22. 1952 GBI. I 615 (author's translation).
23. 1958 GBI. I 664.
[Vol. 13:832
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had no right to deal with his assets and lost even his legal claim to
information concerning them.
The powers of expatriate property administrators were substan-
tially enhanced by the Order of December 11, 1968,24 which gave
them the power to sell expatriates' property to satisfy the claims of
third parties, including claims of the State. Sales were facilitated by a
revaluation of the property which invariably resulted in drastically re-
duced prices. Moreover, agents were authorized to charge a fee for
their services which could be satisfied out of the expatriates' assets.
3. Assets of Germans Living Outside the G.D.R. but Not Defined
as Expatriates
The legal status of property belonging to Germans who had left
their domicile with official permission before 1945 was not addressed
by the East German government prior to the "Decree Concerning the
Securing of Assets" of July 17, 1952.25 The Decree stipulated that
such property was to be placed under the temporary administration of
the East German government. This temporary administration was
subsequently repealed by the "Order of December 1, 1953," which re-
mained in effect until November 14, 1989.26 The Order of December
1, 1953 obligated non-resident owners either 1) to arrange for the ad-
ministration of their property in the G.D.R. themselves, or 2) to sell
such property to a third party. Where the owner did not fulfill this
obligation, the State installed its own administrator. In either case,
the non-resident had little control over his assets: proceeds such as
rent payments were automatically deposited in a restricted East Ger-
man State Bank account. Withdrawals by the owner were allowed
only with permission of the bank, and all costs for the upkeep of the
property, including taxes, were automatically deducted from this
account.
27
4. Restraints on the Transfer of Real Property, Compulsory Loans
and Mortgages
Throughout its history, the G.D.R. placed extensive restrictions on
the transfer of real property interests by private citizens. Government
approval was required not only to sell land outright, but also to con-
clude even a simple lease agreement. Landlord/tenant law in East
24. 1969 GBI. II 1.
25. See supra note 22.
26. 1953 GBI. 1 1231.
27. Hebing, supra note 11, at 4.
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Germany placed the entire burden for maintenance and repairs on the
owner of the underlying "fee," and required the issuance of "compul-
sory loans" secured by "compulsory mortgages" on the property in
cases where the landlord was deemed to have neglected his responsi-
bilities. The overall effect of such measures was to make ownership of
real property in the G.D.R. an economic liability of intolerable pro-
portions. Though property holders hoped to salvage some value by
voluntary transfer, government-imposed conditions on such "sales"
usually amounted to expropriation without compensation.
28
5. "Classical" Expropriations After 1952
The government of the G.D.R. conducted further seizures of real
property in the course of implementing a series of laws designed to
create and improve the national infrastructure. Although Article 23
of the Constitution (1949) required compensation to the owner for all
such takings, procedural rules and regulations concerning computa-
tion of the amount to be paid did not exist until passage of the "Law
Concerning Compensation" of April 25, 1960.29 With these measures
the authorities satisfied the State's need for land on which to construct
roads, post-offices, energy installations and other public utilities.
Although the takings were not politically motivated in most cases, the
amount of compensation was determined by government-appointed
appraisers who based their calculations on property values assessed as
of January 1, 1935.30
D. Expropriations After 1972
In the early 1970s the authorities in the G.D.R. set out to eliminate
the remnants of private investment in business and create a truly uni-
form system of "people's ownership." The resulting wave of confisca-
tions in 1972 was aimed at the most profitable of the remaining private
firms, nearly all of which were already partially state-owned.
These confiscations usually took the form of "voluntary" sales to
the State of the citizen's residual interest in the business. Ironically,
prices for these coerced transactions were determined by provisions of
the "Decree concerning Treatment of Claims of Private Investors who
Withdraw on Their Own Initiative from Businesses Partially Owned
by the State" of December 15, 1972.31 Up to 10,000 Ost-Marks of the
28. See DDR HANDBUCH, supra note 4.
29. 1960 GBI. I 257 (author's translation).
30. Hebing, supra note 11, at 4.
31. 1972 GBI. II 763 (author's translation).
(Vol. 13:832
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sales proceeds could be paid to the seller immediately; the portion of
the sales price exceeding 10,000 Marks was automatically deposited in
a savings account, from which the individual was allowed to withdraw
an additional 10,000 Marks annually.
II. APPLICABLE LAW AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1990
Introduction
In early 1990, as the East German economy hastened towards col-
lapse, the government began to recognize that the question of individ-
ual property rights was fundamental to the transition to a market
economy now regarded as inevitable. It became apparent that the
State-run manufacturing and agricultural conglomerates were incapa-
ble of sustaining operations even while their artificial monopolies re-
mained in place. Incentives which would lure private investors back
into an active economic role were urgently required. As a result, the
interim government of Hans Modrow passed the "Act concerning the
Establishment and Activities of Private Businesses" of March 7,
1990,32 pursuant to which the State offered to resell to the original
owners, or their heirs, the interests in business entities expropriated
under the 1972 decrees. Far more important in this regard, however,
were two agreements concluded by the new democratically elected
East German government in contemplation of the coming reunifica-
tion: 1) the "Joint Declaration of the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. Con-
cerning Unresolved Property Questions" of June 15, 199033 ("Joint
Declaration") and 2) the "Treaty Concerning the Establishment of
German Unity" of August 31, 199034 ("Unity Treaty"). Each of these
documents is examined in some detail below.
A. The Joint Declaration
The Joint Declaration was concluded only after protracted and
sometimes acrimonious negotiations between the two German govern-
ments. 35 After describing the nature of the unresolved property own-
ership problems and reciting its goal of creating a "socially acceptable
32. 1990 GBI. 1 141 (author's translation).
33. Gemeinsame Erklirung der Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Regelung offener Vermogensfragen, 1990 BGBI. II
1237 (Joint Declaration of the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. Respecting Property Questions) [hereinaf-
ter Joint Declaration] (author's translation).
34. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik diber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands, 1990 BGBI. II 889 (Treaty Between the
F.R.G. and the G.D.R. concerning Establishment of German Unity) [hereinafter Unity Treaty]
(author's translation).
35. Carl Graf Hohenthal, Opfer aufdem Altar der Geschichte?, FAZ, Sept. 5, 1990, at 1.
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adjustment of conflicting interests, ' 36 the document states:
1. Expropriations carried out on the basis of occupation law or authority
(1945 to 1949) can. no longer be rescinded. The governments of the
U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. see no possibility of annulling the measures
then undertaken. In light of historical developments, the government of
the Federal Republic of Germany acknowledges this decision. It is of
the opinion, nevertheless, that a final decision concerning any burden-
sharing payments must be reserved to a future pan-German
parliament.
37
In section 2 the parties agree that involuntary fiduciary administra-
tion and similar measures limiting the rights of owners to deal in and
with real property, businesses, and other assets "are to be abolished."
Citizens whose property was nationalized due to "flight from the
G.D.R. or other reasons" are once again to receive all rights over such
assets.
3
In section 3 the signatories agree to the basic principle that real
property confiscated after 1949 will be returned to its original owners,
with two qualifications. 39 First, outright restitution of property which
has been dedicated to the public, incorporated in complex residential
settlements, or adapted to business purposes "is, by nature of the mat-
ter, impossible." 40 In such cases, former owners will receive monetary
compensation instead of the property itself. Second, to the extent that
citizens of the G.D.R. have acquired, in good faith, ownership or other
property rights in real estate which is subject to a claim by the former
owner, the latter will be compensated in money or by exchange of
parcels of similar value.4' The principles of this section are then de-
clared to apply equally to property nationalized for "economic" rea-
sons (as described supra p. 845).42
36. Joint Declaration, supra note 33, pmbl. (author's translation).
37. Id. § 1.
38. Id. § 2.
39. Subsequent legislation has significantly expanded the number and scope of the exceptions
to this basic principle. As described in the text infra, Article 41 of the Unity Treaty itself sets
forth an "investment exception" to the restitution rule which is further defined in an act ap-
pended to the Unity Treaty, the Gesetz iiber besondere Investitionen in dem in Artikel 3 des
Einigungsvertrages genannten Gebiet (Investitionsgesetz), 1991 BGBI. I 994 (as amended effec-
tive Mar. 29, 1991). A second act attached to the Unity Treaty, the Gesetz zur Regelung offener
Verm6gensfragen (Vermogensgesetz - Verm G), 1991 BGBI. I 957 (as amended effective Mar.
29, 1991) establishes additional requirements for claimants of property expropriated after 1949.
A discussion of these laws is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Fieberg & Reichen-
bach, supra note 1; Jurgen Kohler, Zivilrechtliche Sicherung der Rtickerstattung von Grund-
stucken in den neuen Bundeslandern, 1991 NJW 465; Michael Gruson & Georg Thoma,
Investments in the Territory of the Former German Democratic Republic, 14 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 540 (1990-91).
40. Joint Declaration, supra note 33, § 3(a) (author's translation).
41. Id. § 3(b).
42. Id. § 4.
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B. The Unity Treaty
The first of the two inter-German treaties, 43 which entered into
force on July 1, 1990, establishes uniformity between the F.R.G. and
the G.D.R. in matters of currency and economics, but contains no
provisions relating to expropriated property, real or personal. The
second agreement, the so-called Unity Treaty" signed in Berlin on
August 31, 1990, addresses all significant issues connected with unifi-
cation of the two States, including the controversial "property
question."
1. Article 41
Article 41 of the Unity Treaty is of fundamental importance. Sec-
tion 1 incorporates the Joint Declaration of June 15, 1990 into the text
of the Treaty, thereby transforming it from a mere "memorandum of
understanding" into directly enforceable federal law. In Section 3 the
F.R.G. declares that it will pass no laws or regulations which contra-
dict the provisions of the Joint Declaration.
2. The New Article 143
Article 4 of the Unity Treaty covers changes to the text of the
F.R.G.'s Constitution (the "Basic Law") required by reunification.
Anticipating constitutional challenge to article 41 of the Treaty, the
signatories deemed it advisable to assure in advance the "constitution-
ality" of this provision by amending the Basic Law itself. In article 4,
section 5, the Treaty therefore inserts a new constitutional article, Ar-
ticle 143, into the Basic Law. This new Article reads in relevant part:
"...article 41 of the Unity Treaty, and regulations for its implementa-
tion, shall be valid despite the fact that they contemplate that infringe-
ments of property rights in [the former G.D.R.] shall not be
annulled." 45
3. Extension of Basic Law Article 135a
Article 135a of the Basic Law grants the West German Parliament
discretion to allow or forbid, in whole or in part, certain claims against
the Third Reich arising out of the Second World War. Article 4, sec-
tion 4 of the Unity Treaty adds a new section to Article 135a which
makes this reservation equally applicable to claims against the former
43. Vertrag iiber die Schaffung einer Wihrungs, Wirtschafts, und Sozialunion (Treaty Re-
garding Creation of Currency, Economic and Social Union), May 18, 1990 BGBI. II 537.
44. Unity Treaty, supra note 34.
45. Id. art. 4, § 5 (author's translation).
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G.D.R. The new Parliament of a unified Germany, in other words,
has the constitutionally recognized discretion to honor or dishonor
dispossessed persons' claims for compensation as it deems appropriate.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STORM
Introduction
The West German government's apparently wholesale recognition
of the confiscations undertaken in the Soviet Occupied Zone prior to
the formation of the G.D.R. in 1949 unleashed a vigorous and some-
times bitter debate within the German bar and public. 46 Constitu-
tional scholars disagreed about the legality of the Unity Treaty in this
respect. Particularly blistering criticism was reserved for the treaty
negotiators' attempt to "heal" perceived constitutional infirmities by
amending the Constitution in the treaty itself. Senior jurists publicly
assailed this maneuver as a crass violation of the separation of powers
principle.47 A sitting justice on Germany's Supreme Civil Court went
so far as to call the new Basic Law Article 143 "patently unconstitu-
tional."'4 Attitudes within the legal community toward the "property
question" could hardly have been more polarized when, on October 5,
1990, only two days after formal union between the Germanies, the
first suit asserting the unconstitutionality of the Unity Treaty's dispo-
sition of pre-1949 seizures was filed with the Supreme Constitutional
Court.49 The main arguments propounded by each side prior to final
decision of the case on April 23, 1991, are examined below.
A. Interpreting the Joint Declaration
Initially, there was considerable disagreement as to the intended
meaning of section 1 of the Joint Declaration. As has been seen, the
text is somewhat imprecise in its identification of exactly which expro-
46. See OTro KIMMINICH, DIE EIGENTUMSGARANTIE IM PROZESS DER WIEDERVER-
EINIGUNG (1990); Enteignungen in der DDR von Anfang an nichtig, DIE WELT, July 20, 1990, at
10; Thierau & Tintelnot, Unklarheiten und verwirrende Regelungen bei Rtickgew'hr enteigneten
Vermogens, HANDELSBLATT, Aug. 20, 1990; Drohende Verfassungsklage, supra note 8;
Hohenthal, supra note 35; von Arnim, supra note 3; Franz Michel, Zur Ruickabwicklung der
Enteignungen, FAZ, Sept. 7, 1990, at 12; Hans Mahrenholz, So wird "dauerhafter Rechtsfrieden"
nicht erreicht, FAZ, Sept. 11, 1990, at 1; Friedrich Fromme, Einheit und alte Rechte, FAZ, Sept.
19, 1990, at 1; Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, Sind nicht in Wahrheit blo Hoffnungen enttauscht
warden?, FAZ, Sept. 22, 1990, at 10; Hans Mund, Ein Beispiel, FAZ, Oct. 11, 1990, at 13; Hans
Papier, Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der Eigentumsregelung im Einigungsvertrag, 44 NJW 193
(1991).
47. von Arnim, supra note 3.
48. Falk Freiherr von Maltzahn, Verfassungswidrige Verfassungsnorm, FAZ, Sept. 24, 1990,
at 11.
49. Beschwerde gegen Regelung der Enteignungen, FAZ, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1.
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priations can no longer be reversed, referring only to those "carried
out on the basis of occupation rights or law (1945 to 1949)." Did the
drafters intend this language to confirm all confiscations which took
place within this four year period, or did they mean to address a subset
of the expropriations, implying that some expropriations occurring
during that period were not made on the basis of occupation rights?50
A variation on the latter interpretation was forcefully advanced by
East German attorney Joachim Ziegner. In an article published before
conclusion of the Unity Treaty,51 Mr. Ziegner demonstrated that all
relevant decrees of the Soviet Military Administration ("SMA") ef-
fected, by their own terms, only a temporary sequestration of prop-
erty, without purporting to make any transfer of ownership rights.
The instructions to SMA Command No. 124 of October 30, 1945, for
example, ordered the "sequestration and temporary administration of
... a) all real property. '5 2 All decisions regarding expropriation of
the individual owners were left to the German administrative councils.
Transfer of title to "people's ownership" was accomplished by subse-
quent laws passed by the governments of the individual Ldnder, not by
Soviet occupation decrees. The overwhelming majority of actual ex-
propriations, Ziegner argued, could thus be ascribed to German civil
councils, not to Soviet military decrees with any articulable basis in
"occupation rights or law."
Moreover, sequestration under the SMA Commands was legally
authorized for only a portion of the time period identified in the Joint
Declaration. SMA Command No. 64 of April 17, 194853 announced
the determination of the occupying authorities that sequestration of
real property was no longer necessary. Section 5 of this Command
therefore repealed Command No. 124 and forbade all further proceed-
ings thereunder. The SMA was thus active only during the period
from May 5, 1945 to April 17, 1948; all expropriations carried out
between April 18, 1948 and October 7, 1949 were undertaken by Ger-
man administrators or Ldnder governments, and should therefore not
be protected by the terms of the Joint Declaration.
The subtleties of Ziegner's argument did not attract a wide follow-
ing; most legal commentators understood Joint Declaration section 1
and the new Basic Law Article 143 as confirming all property takings
which occurred prior to the establishment of the East German Consti-
50. See, e.g., Heinrich Deubner, Nicht alle Enteignungen bis 1949 bestdtigt, FAZ, Sept. 15,
1990, at 11; von Maltzahn, supra note 48, at 11.
51. Ziegner, Was nach dem Krieg geschah war Unrecht, DIE WELT, July 20, 1990, at 10.
52. BESTIMMUNGEN, supra note 12, at 51.
53. 1948 GBI. Sachsen-Anhalt 68.
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tution. The proposition, however, that the legal effects of a massive
campaign of ideological persecution, of which expropriation was only
one instrumentality, could now be sanctioned and permanently se-
cured under the venerated Basic Law profoundly offended the sensibil-
ities of many West Germans.
B. The Joint Declaration: Retroactive Sanction
for Ideological Terrorism ?
Certainly the most passionately argued challenge to the Joint Dec-
laration was published by Professor Hans von Arnim in a lengthy
analysis for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.54 Von Arnim as-
sailed as fundamentally meaningless the choice of October 7, 1949 as
the "cut-off point" for property claims. The measures carried out both
before and after this date, he argued, were alike the expressions of a
uniform communist ideology put into effect by the ruling Socialist
Unity Party ("S.E.D."). The perversity of the "land reform" under-
taken during this period, in his view, is especially evident in the fact
that owners of more than 100 hectares were officially assigned the
same classification as "Nazi leaders and war criminals," solely by rea-
son of this ownership. It was in many cases precisely those individuals
directly involved in the resistance to National Socialism (whose prop-
erty was confiscated by the Third Reich after the failed assassination
attempt on Adolf Hitler) who were then dispossessed for the second
time by the S.E.D. after 1945. 55 Von Arnim likewise challenged the
presumption of the Joint Declaration that the 1945-49 expropriations
''can no longer be rescinded." The vast State landholdings assembled
primarily during the period of "land reform," he argued, would in fact
be privatized, but the Unity Treaty appears to deny the original own-
ers all right to reclaim them.
In von Arnim's view, the Joint Declaration's and the Unity
Treaty's treatment of dispossessed people's claims violates at least
three "fundamental rights" enumerated in the Basic Law: 1) the right
to the protection of personal property set forth in Article 14;56 2) the
54. von Arnim, supra note 3.
55. Id. One of many such cases is recounted by Graf Hardenberg-Neuhardenberg, Der
geplante Verfassungsputsch, FAZ, Sept., 1990.
56. GG art. 14 provides in relevant part:
(1) The right of private property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. The content
and limitations of such rights shall be determined by the legislature .... (3) Expropriation
shall be permitted only when in the interest of the general public. It may be accomplished
only through or by virtue of an act of the legislature which regulates the type and amount of
compensation to be paid. The amount of compensation shall be determined after a just
weighing of the interests of the individual and the public. The district courts shall have
jurisdiction to hear any appeal from such a decision.
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principle of "equal protection" mandated by Article 3, section 1;5 7 and
3) the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of origin or class
laid down in Article 3, section 3.58 The legal import of proposed new
Basic Law Article 143 is that these and other fundamental rights are
to be simply withdrawn from those affected by "land reform."
Particularly objectionable, in von Arnim's view, was the Bonn gov-
ernment's decision to deny this group recourse even to Basic Law Ar-
ticle 19, section 2, which prohibits any branch of government from
altering or weakening the "core meaning" of the enumerated "funda-
mental rights." 59 Such a result appears particularly crass in light of
the fact that other provisions of East German law, which under the
Unity Treaty are expressly permitted to deviate from the Basic Law
for a defined transition period, are nevertheless void to the extent their
enforcement would violate the "core meaning" clause of Article 19.
60
Von Arnim sees the Unity Treaty drafters' attempt to forestall
constitutional challenge to the treaty by amending the Basic Law in
the treaty itself as a plain violation of the separation of powers'princi-
ple contained in Basic Law Article 20.61 Quoting Professor Horst
Ehmke, he asserts that parliamentary amendments to the Basic Law
cannot decree that "constitutional provisions are not to be applied to
particular cases or for particular periods of time ... For this would
mean the abandonment of the very concept of constitutional govern-
ment; the Constitution would lose all meaning, and in place of a free
and democratic form of government we would have simply the absolu-
tism of the current two-thirds majority."'6
2
In addition to this separation of powers argument, von Arnim
points out that Basic Law Article 79, section 3 specifically forbids any
constitutional amendment which disturbs the unenumerated class of
"inviolable and inalienable human rights" addressed in Article 1 or
the "fundamental rights" enumerated in Articles 2 through 20.63 It is
(author's translation).
57. Id. art. 3(1), which provides: "All persons are equal before the law." (author's
translation).
58. Id. art. 3(3), which provides: "No one may be discriminated against or preferred because
of his sex, family background, race, language, geographical origin, beliefs, or religious or political
views." (author's translation).
59. Id. art. 19(2), which reads: "In no event may the core meaning of a [constitutional provi-
sion defining a] fundamental right be altered." (author's translation).
60. Unity Treaty, supra note 34, art. 4, § 5.
61. The text of GG art. 20(3) is set forth infra at note 69.
62. von Arnim, supra note 3, at 8 (author's translation).
63. GG art. 79(3), which provides: "An amendment to this Basic Law by which the division
of the republic into Lander, the fundamental role of the L'nder in the legislative process, or the
principles set forth in articles I and 20 hereof, are infringed, is void." (author's translation). This
provision has been denominated the "eternity clause" because it was intended to secure the enu-
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the experience of Germany's recent past, in his view, which has hith-
erto prompted the West German judiciary to guard this principle so
jealously.
C. The Joint Declaration as Reluctant Realpolitik
These widely-discussed constitutional objections to the Unity
Treaty were most cogently answered in a lengthy analysis by Professor
Hans-Jirgen Papier published shortly before issuance of the Supreme
Court's decision. 64 Papier notes initially that the legislative treatment
of 1945-49 expropriations has de facto constitutional validity because
of new Article 143. The question now cannot be whether the original
confiscations are somehow unconstitutional, but rather solely whether
the Unity Treaty negotiated by the German government, which is sub-
ject to the Basic Law, violates constitutional principles by distancing
itself from restitution or compensation for these past takings.65 In
light of the new Basic Law amendments it is likewise irrelevant to ask
whether the treaty and its implementing laws violate the property
guaranty of Article 14 or the equal protection principle of Article 3.
The sole pertinent inquiry, in Papier's view, is the narrow question of
whether the "eternity clause" of Basic Law Article 79, which im-
pliedly protects the "core meaning" of fundamental rights enumerated
in Articles 2 through 19 without guaranteeing the full extent of their
current form, has been impermissibly ignored by these treaty-based
Basic Law amendments.
66
1. Is the Basic Law Controlling?
Papier notes that the "expropriations... on the basis of occupation
rights or law (1945 to 1949)" cannot be measured against the property
guaranty of Article 14, since the Basic Law is binding only on the
particular State authority which it constitutes. It is meaningless to
inquire whether the 1945-49 confiscations were carried out by Soviet
or German officials, since even the latter were not acting on behalf of
the government established by the Basic Law. Moreover, no retroac-
tive application of this document in the ex-G.D.R. is contemplated in
any provision of the treaty. 67
Second, the confiscatory actions in question cannot be attributed to
merated principles against alteration in perpetuity. The text of arts. I and 20 is set forth infra at
note 69.
64. Papier, supra note 46.
65. Id. at 194.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 195 (author's translation).
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the F.R.G. under the theory that it is somehow the "successor-in-in-
terest" to the G.D.R. West Germany's ratification of the Unity
Treaty did not constitute a repetition, confirmation, or adoption of
these expropriations; it represented rather a realistic political assess-
ment of the acts as unalterable historical reality and a decision to
forego any attempt to alter the status quo presented to it. Fundamen-
tal to any analysis under the property guaranty, including evaluation
of its human-rights component, is a consideration of whether the State
formed under the Basic Law is itself prosecuting such takings or is
merely reacting to the actions of a foreign government.
68
2. The Property Right as a "Fundamental Right"
In Papier's view, Basic Law Article 14 establishes an individual
right to freedom of action with regard to existing property and pro-
tects against any invasion of the protected sphere by the government
established under the Constitution. Article 14 is not violated by West
German authority in the present case, since neither the Unity Treaty
nor its accompanying legislative enactments themselves effect the con-
fiscations or in any way repeat or confirm them. The treaty provisions
could contravene Article 14 only if the latter established a right to
acquire or reacquire individual property, in addition to the purely de-
fensive right described above.
Moreover, the "eternity clause" of Article 79, which prohibits al-
teration or amendment of the "principles contained in Articles 1 and
20," does not specifically mention the fundamental rights set forth in
Articles 2 through 19.69 The individual rights described therein are
thus not guaranteed in their currently existing form. 70 The Parliament
is permitted under Article 79 to limit or restrict by constitutional
68. Id.
69. GG art. 1 reads:
(1) The dignity of man is inviolable. To observe and protect it is the obligation of all state
power. (2) The German people acknowledge the inviolable and inalienable human rights as
the basis for every human relation, for peace and justice in the world. (3) The following
fundamental rights are binding on the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly
applicable law.
(author's translation). GG art. 20 provides:
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (2) All gov-
ernment power proceeds from the people. It is exercised by them in elections and referenda
and through the special organs of the legislative, executive and judicial branches. (3) The
legislative branch is bound by the consitutional order. The executive and judicial branches
are bound by the laws.
(author's translation).
70. These include, for example, the right to "free development of one's personality" and the
"right to life and bodily safety" (art. 2); equality before the law (art. 3); freedom of religion and
of conscientious objection to military service (art. 4); freedom of the press, of art, and of science
(art. 5); freedom of assembly (art. 8); freedom of movement (art. I1); the right of petition (art.
17); and numerous others.
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amendment the exercise of particular rights, so long as it does not
disturb the "fundamental principles" of Articles 1 and 20. Examples
of such inviolable fundamental principles include: "the dignity of
mankind," "inviolable and inalienable human rights as the foundation
of human society," and the essential character of the F.R.G. as a
"democratic and social federal State." Parliament thus retains broad
scope for legislation.
7'
3. The Limits of Constitutional Amendment
In light of these general principles for the interpretation of Article
79, Papier asserts, the "core meaning" of the Basic Law's property
guaranty, including its human rights component, cannot be altered
even by constitutional amendment.72 The Supreme Constitutional
Court has always regarded Article 14 as "a fundamental
right... which stands in close connection to the guaranty of personal
freedom.' 73 Article 14 fulfills the function of preserving to the indi-
vidual "a sphere of freedom in the area of personal property. . .which
enables him to arrange his life in a responsible manner.' 74 This inter-
section of the property guaranty with the constitutionally recognized
right to unhindered individual personality development defines the ba-
sic human rights component or "core meaning" of Article 14, which is
inviolable under the "eternity clause" of Article 79.75 An indispensa-
ble minimum level of property protection forms the basis for individ-
ual human development and cannot be relinquished to the State, even
by means of a constitutional amendment.
With regard to the 1945-49 expropriations, however, we do not
encounter a situation in which the government constituted by the Ba-
sic Law is disregarding the human rights-related core meaning of the
property guaranty: only in such a case could Article 79's "eternity
clause" come into play. For the former owners and devisees of prop-
erty expropriated more than forty years ago, the minimum economic
basis for the free development of individual personality is not at stake.
What these plaintiffs demand is the reversal of specific past acts of a
foreign governmental authority and the restoration of the status quo
ante. It is this restoration, Papier argues, which surely exceeds the
71. See Papier, supra note 46, at 195.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 196 (quoting 24 BVerfGE at 367, 389) (author's translation).
75. GG art. 2(1), which reads: "Every individual has the right to free development of his
personality to the extent that he does not infringe the rights of others or undermine the constitu-
tional order or good morals." (author's translation).
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intended scope of the protection afforded by Article 79.76
4. The F.R.G. as "Constitutional State"
In Papier's view, the appeal to the general German legal principle
that the F.R.G. is a constitutional State ("Rechtsstaat") does not
change this result. The Supreme Constitutional Court has indeed rec-
ognized that certain elements of this principle can be derived from
Article 20 and are therefore protected in perpetuity by Article 79;
77
among those elements are the concept of "separation of powers" and
the subordination of the legislative branch to the "constitutional or-
der."'78 The Basic Law amendments, particularly the new Article 143,
however, do not constitute an impermissible circumvention of the judi-
cial branch in derogation of the separation of powers principle. Gen-
erally speaking, it is the prerogative of parliament to direct the
judiciary to the proper rule of decision; we cannot classify every legis-
lative enactment which binds the executive and judicial branches of
government as an impermissible infringement of the latters' power.
5. "Equal Protection"
On its face, the Unity Treaty's determination that property expro-
priated after 1949 will be returned, while assets taken prior to that
date cannot be reclaimed, appears to violate the "equal protection"
principle set forth in Basic Law Article 3. This discrimination, how-
ever, is likewise "constitutionalized" by the new Basic Law Article
143, so that it only remains to inquire whether such an amendment
itself exceeds the limits imposed by Article 79. Papier notes that Arti-
cle 3, like the property guaranty of Article 14, is not specifically men-
tioned in Article 79, and thus is not directly protected by the "eternity
clause." Nevertheless, the equality principle of Article 3, which pro-
hibits arbitrary governmental discrimination between citizens, embod-
ies a general legal maxim inherent in western notions of a
constitutional order. This principle is, in fact, derived from considera-
tions of basic fairness, and should thus arguably be included in the
fundamental principles which enjoy the protection of the "eternity
clause" via Article 20.79
The West German government's refusal to recognize restitution
claims for pre-1949 expropriations, however, cannot arguably be de-
76. Papier, supra note 46, at 196.
77. See supra note 63.
78. See supra note 69.
79. Papier, supra note 46, at 196.
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scribed as "arbitrary." The government's constitutional mandate to
pursue reunification, coupled with the considerable pressures brought
to bear by foreign powers in international negotiations leading to
unity, justify Bonn's acquiescence on this point. The U.S.S.R. and the
G.D.R., both of which played decisive roles in the reunification pro-
cess, made it clear from the outset that preservation of the "land re-
form" was a material condition to their continued participation in the
process.80 The F.R.G. thereupon accepted this state of affairs as his-
torically irreversible in order to avoid endangering the chances for
reunification. Whether Bonn's estimation of what was realistically ob-
tainable in these negotiations was correct is not a question for the
Supreme Constitutional Court, according to Papier. It was a political
decision which lay in the peculiar domain of the legislative branch of
government. 8'
D. The Supreme Constitutional Court's "Land Reform" Decision
Introduction
The Supreme Constitutional Court's opinion, which was issued on
April 23, 1991, is sixty pages long in the original: only a fraction of
these are substantive.8 2 After reprinting the text of important legisla-
tive enactments at issue in the litigation and recounting the history of
relevant treaty negotiations and various supplemental acts, the opinion
summarizes the principal arguments of the parties. Only after giving a
pr6cis of certain prior decisions of the Supreme Civil Court and the
Supreme Administrative Court on tangential questions does the Court
reach the issues presented, dealing first with procedure, then with
substance. 83
1. Procedure
The Court was initially obligated to determine whether the plain-
tiffs' action was the proper means under German law for challenging
the constitutionality of the Unity Treaty Implementing Act.8 4 In the
course of resolving this question in the affirmative, the opinion states
that the 1945-49 expropriations are emphatically to be classified as
80. See Fieberg & Reichenbach, supra note 1, at 322 (recounting the history of the negotia-
tion process).
81. Papier, supra note 46, at 197.
82. Decision, supra note 5.
83. Id. at A V(2), (3).
84. German law provides that any citizen can challenge the enforcement of a law or adminis-
trative act which infringes upon the fundamental rights set forth in the Basic Law by a direct
appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) to the Supreme Constitutional Court as long as all other reme-
dies have been exhausted. GG, supra note 7, art. 93(l)(4)(a).
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"based on occupation law or authority." Although the takings were
made pursuant to SMA Command No. 124 the opinion notes that
they rest only partly on occupation law, since the confiscations them-
selves were effected by implementing laws passed by German organs.
Nevertheless, these laws were made on the basis of "occupation au-
thority," since they were sanctioned by the Soviet occupiers and de-
pended substantively on their decisions.85 The influence of the
occupying authority, according to the Court, is further demonstrated
by the fact that SMA Command No. 64 expressly confirmed expropri-
ations previously carried out.
86
With specific regard to the "land reform" measures, the Court ad-
mits that these takings do not at first blush appear to fit within the
"occupation law or authority" category, since the relevant laws and
decrees were issued solely by German authorities. Nevertheless, the
Court does define these takings as occurring under occupation law,
''since the train of events indicates that they were not only accepted by
the Soviet occupying power, but conformed to its stated will and inten-
tion."'8 7 This is best demonstrated by the Command of October 22,
1945, which declared that all acts which were passed by the State and
provincial governments installed by the Soviets, and which were con-
sistent with orders of the SMA, were to "have the force of law."' 8
Importantly, the G.D.R. and the U.S.S.R. also insisted on the view
that the "land reform" measures were based on "occupation author-
ity;" this was expressed in the Soviet "Statement" of April 27, 1990
and other official documents.8 9
2. Substance
The Supreme Constitutional Court declared that Unity Treaty pro-
visions confirming the 1945-49 expropriations do not violate the plain-
tiffs' constitutional rights. These provisions are specifically made valid
under the new Basic Law Article 143. They could violate the Consti-
tution only if Article 143 were itself invalid. This is not the case.90
85. The German adjectives "besatzungsrechtlich" and "besatzungshoheitlich" have no Eng-
lish equivalents. I have chosen to render the former "pertaining to or based on occupation law,"
and the latter "pertaining to or based on occupation authority." The concept of a law or decree
derived from "occupation authority" is an invention of the Joint Declaration drafters and has no
previous place in German constitutional jurisprudence. See supra text accompanying notes 56-
60.
86. See supra note 53.
87. Decision, supra note 5, at B 1(2).
88. Reprinted in INGO VON MONCH, DOcUMENTE DES GETEILTEN DEUTSCHLAND 294
(1968) (author's translation).
89. TASS, Mar. 27, 1990.
90. Decision, supra note 5, at C II.
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The procedure chosen by the government of including constitu-
tional amendments required by unification within the text of the Unity
Treaty, so that Parliament could only vote yes or no on the measures
as a package, was necessitated by the course of treaty negotiations and
amply justified by the broad constitutional mandate for reunification.
This linkage could not be given up without endangering the chances
for unification. 91
New Article 143 also does not violate the separation of powers
principle. It does not retroactively remove from constitutional scru-
tiny an act of the government created by the Basic Law. The measure
simply defines the extent to which implementation of the Basic Law in
new territory will be allowed to affect certain actions which occurred
in the past. 9
2
Like every other constitutional amendment, however, Article 143
must pass the test imposed by Article 79(3), which forbids any amend-
ment "disturbing the principles set forth in Article 1 and Article
20."93 Among these principles are the "dignity of mankind" and cer-
tain unenumerated "inviolable and inalienable human rights." The
reference in Article 1(3) to the individual rights enumerated in Arti-
cles 2 through 19 means that their guarantees also may only be limited
to the extent compatible with the preservation of a political order
which upholds these basic principles. 94 Even the majority required to
amend the Basic Law may not ignore basic principles of justice such as
the concept of equality before the law and the prohibition against arbi-
trary government action. Article 79(3), however, requires only that
these principles not be "disturbed;" it does not prevent the legislature
from amending the particular manner in which these rights are exer-
cised, as long as such modification is justified after consideration of all
relevant factors. 95
The Court found that toleration of pre-1949 expropriations does
not transgress the above-described limits of Article 79(3). Initially,
the Court held that the plaintiffs had no legal rights at the time of
reunification which could be injured by such an action. 96 An individ-
ual right must always be established by reference to a concrete and
existing legal system. The expropriations which took place in the So-
viet Occupied Zone/G.D.R. were designed to deprive the owner of all
91. Id. at C II(1)(a).
92. Id. at C II(1)(b).
93. GG, supra note 63.
94. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(a).
95. Id.
96. Id. at C II(2)(b)(aa).
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legal rights to the property. These confiscations were consistently
viewed by the Soviets, the German authorities in the Occupied Zone,
and the G.D.R. government as having full legal force and effect. For-
mer owners of East German real property thus had no residual prop-
erty interests which could have been violated at the time of
reunification.
Regardless of whether the expropriations are ascribed to the Soviet
Army or to the German authorities, however, they cannot be laid at
the feet of the Federal Republic. The F.R.G. has always felt responsi-
ble for all of "Germany," but it cannot be held liable for putative un-
constitutional acts which took place outside the territorial reach of its
sovereignty. 97 German law generally recognizes expropriations of a
foreign State as long as the government of such State does not venture
beyond its territorial boundaries. This principle is limited solely by
the concept of the German ordre public, which only comes into play in
cases of a substantial domestic and contemporaneous injury.
98
The plaintiffs' objection that the confiscations were part of a radi-
cal transformation of society on the model of a socialist State is inap-
posite, according to the justices, for "[i]t inheres in the character of
such an order that little or no compensation can be given: otherwise
the intended social revolution is spoiled." 99
The Supreme Constitutional Court, the opinion continues, has de-
termined in its "War Consequences" line of cases that the Basic Law
principle defining Germany as a "social State" requires the F.R.G.
government to promulgate "burden-sharing" legislation in such
cases.100 Bonn has adequately fulfilled this obligation, however, via
sentence 4 of Joint Declaration section 1.101 The government may, at
its discretion, arrange for compensation in excess of such burden-shar-
ing payments, but Article 79(3) cannot be interpreted to mandate res-
titution of title as the only permissible means of compensation. 10 2
Compensation claims for past injustices of the type indicated can-
97. Id. at C lI(2)(b)(aa)(2).
98. Id. at C II(2)(b)(aa)(3).
99. Id. (author's translation).
100. Burden-sharing (Lastenausgleich) was instituted after World War II in order to par-
tially compensate German citizens who had been rendered homeless or substantially destitute by
the hostilities. Certain taxes were levied beginning in 1949 on individuals or corporations resi-
dent in West Germany as of June 21, 1948, and the proceeds granted upon application to com-
pensate for losses and assist refugees in establishing new lives in the F.R.G. Gesetz Uber den
Lastenausgleich (Burden-Sharing Act) 1969 BGBI. 1 1909 (as amended); A brief overview is
provided in 0. MODEL ET AL., STAATSBORGER TASCHENBUCH, § 565 (Lastenausgleich-
sabgeben) 677-79 (24th ed. 1989).
101. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(cc)(l). See also Joint Declaration, supra note 33.
102. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(cc)(2).
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not be based on the human rights set forth in the Basic Law, but must
rather be derived solely from an inference from the "social State" prin-
ciple embodied therein.10 3 The Joint Declaration, the opinion notes,
does not by its terms prohibit a former owner from purchasing his
property back, to the extent this is possible after weighing various
competing interests. '04
Objections to denial of restitution under Joint Declaration section
1 likewise do not obtain constitutional status because such restitution
is the general rule for individuals whose property was expropriated
after 1949. Bonn's decision to deny restitution is amply justified by (a)
the insistence of the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. on this point, and (b) the
F.R.G.'s conclusion that any continued objection on its part might
endanger chances for reunification. "This assessment of what was re-
alistically obtainable in the actual negotiations was the sole responsi-
bility of the federal government and cannot legitimately be the subject
of judicial review in this, or any other, Court."105
Finally, the justices opine, the Joint Declaration clause which
reserves to a pan-German legislature any decision regarding "burden-
sharing" regulations likewise does not violate the basic rights of the
complainants. The plaintiffs correctly argue that the legislature lacks
the discretion to decline to create any burden-sharing system at all.
The equal protection principle of Article 3(1)106 is directly applicable
here; having allowed the victims of post-1949 confiscations the right to
restitution, the government is not free to leave the complainants to-
tally without compensation.' 0 7 The text of the Joint Declaration,
however, does not prevent the legislature from fulfilling its constitu-
tional obligations in this regard. In determining the correct measure
of such compensation, Parliament may take into account the financial
means available in light of all other public expenditures in the budget,
including, of course, the massive outlays which will be required to re-
build eastern Germany in the next few years. In view of the fact that
present estimates put this figure well into the hundred billions (DM),
any possible obligation to make monetary compensation approximat-
ing the value of property taken must be dismissed.' 0 8
103. Although the plaintiffs have no justiciable constitutional rights applicable to this case,
they may have some kind of claim against the West German government under "burden-shar-
ing" law, an outgrowth of the sentiment that all West-Germans should share equally the hard-
ship resulting from World War II.
104. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(cc)(2).
105. Id. at C II(2)(b)(cc)(3) (author's translation).
106. See supra note 57.
107. Decision, supra note 5, at C IIl(I)(a).
108. Id. at C 111(2).
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"We need not decide today whether new Article 135a(2) is conso-
nant with Article 79(3). As explained above, the former does not free
the legislature from the strictures of the equal protection clause, nor
does it prevent the Parliament from devising a constitutional scheme
for 'burden-sharing.' Inasmuch as Article 135a(2) could have any dis-
advantageous effect on the plaintiffs, such would arise only in the fu-
ture upon passage of the law creating the putatively inadequate
'burden-sharing' arrangement, and not directly through the provisions
before us today." 10 9
E. Analysis
Introduction
The Supreme Constitutional Court's decision was greeted with in-
comprehension by most observers. The Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung entitled its front-page editorial "Many Words and Little Clar-
ity." 110 Though it was generally conceded that the Court was han-
dling a politically sensitive topic under enormous political pressure,
most commentators were dismayed by the opinion's lack of organiza-
tion and its failure to address so many relevant questions: questions
which had been publicly debated at least since publication of the Joint
Declaration. I "
The Court's decision to deny restitution for expropriations occur-
ring between 1945 and 1949, however, was widely expected. After all,
in the highly-charged atmosphere of a reunified Germany, a court-
imposed transfer of approximately one-third of the territory of the for-
mer G.D.R. would have caused a radical restructuring of existing eco-
nomic relationships and serious social unrest. The foreign relations
implications of such an act were also enormous, especially given the
U.S.S.R.'s firm insistence that its policies as victorious power in east-
ern Germany remain immune to review by courts of the F.R.G."
2
The Bonn government made clear during oral arguments that this had
been a condition precedent to Soviet agreement on reunification, and
that judicial reversal of the policy would be considered impermissible
meddling in political affairs.' 1 3
Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning, where intelligible, has defied
methodical analysis. The eight justices appear to ignore arguments
109. Id. at C IV (author's translation).
110. Friedrich K. Fromme, Viele Worte und wenig Klarheit, FAZ, Apr. 24, 1991, at I (au-
thor's translation).
111. Id.
112. See Fieberg & Reichenbach, supra note 1, at 322.
113. Decision, supra note 5, at A V(1)(a).
Summer 1992]
Michigan Journal of International Law
which both sides considered essential to determining the case." 14
Many questions raised in the course of litigation are not addressed,
and even the fundamental reasons for the Court's ruling must often be
deduced or developed from scattered references in the text. The
Court's lack of clarity is troubling because, as discussed below,t 5 the
decision could have profound and unintended consequences in other
areas of constitutional jurisprudence, especially in the law of asylum
and in the rights of foreigners in Germany.
In the most thorough and probing analysis to date, Professor Wal-
ter Leisner has delineated three fundamental theses underlying the
Court's decision: 1) the expropriations of 1945-49 constitute actions
of a foreign power; 2) they may be accepted as legally binding by the
F.R.G.; and 3) it cannot be argued in opposition that such actions
were elements of a campaign of persecution violative of fundamental
human rights. 116
1. German Law or "Occupation Law?"
With regard to (1), Leisner notes that the Court simply dismisses a
question which both sides in the litigation considered determinative:
whether "German law" or "occupation law" was at work in effecting
the confiscations in the Soviet Zone. The Court states that the ex-
propriationary measures "were promulgated solely by German enti-
ties," yet cautions that "it is undetermined whether and to what extent
the occupying power exercised pressure in this regard."' ' 7 This very
uncertainty, notes Leisner, prevents the straightforward classification
as "occupation law," which would relieve West Germany of any possi-
ble obligation to correct the confiscations in question." 8 The Court
gets around this difficulty, however, by describing the expropriations
as "measures on the basis of occupation authority."'' t 9 The decision
uses the term "occupation authority" in such a way as to encompass
all administrative and legislative acts of the eastern Ldnder. Yet, ac-
114. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
115. GG art. 16(2), which reads in relevant part: "politically persecuted individuals shall
have the right of asylum." (author's translation). The broad scope of Germany's asylum law,
perhaps adopted partly as a reaction to the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime, has guaran-
teed a steady flow of applicants from around the world. Attempts to restrict abuse of the law
were made in 1982, Asylverfahrensgesetz, 1982 BGBI. I 946, and in 1987, Gesetz zur Anderung
asylverfahrensrechtlicher, arbeits erlaubnisrechtlicher, und auslinderrechtlicher Vorschriften,
1987 BGBI. I 89.
116. Walter Leisner, Das Bodenreform-Urteil des Bundesverfassungs-gerichts, 1991 NJW
1569, 1570-72.
117. Decision, supra note 5, at B 1(2).
118. Leisner, supra note 116, at 1570.
119. See supra note 84.
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cording to Leisner, such a concept is entirely foreign to German law,
which traditionally distinguished between "directed German law,"
which was classified as occupation law, and "indirect, hidden occupa-
tion law." Under the more traditional analytical framework, the ex-
propriations in question could only be considered German law: mere
post facto agreement of occupying authorities to German acts cannot
by itself convert such acts into "occupation law."
' ' 20
To avoid classifying the 1945-49 expropriations as "German law,"
the Supreme Court gave its blessing to this novel doctrine of "occupa-
tion authority." Yet, Leisner points out, attributing post-war confisca-
tions to "occupation authority" cannot alter the essential character of
these measures as German law: otherwise all West German legislative
acts between 1945 and 1949, including adoption of the Basic Law it-
self, would have to be regarded as products of "occupation authority."
If the Basic Law is German law, argues Leisner, so also is the expro-
priation legislation of the Soviet Occupied Zone.'
2'
Yet the Court did not clearly classify the expropriations as "virtu-
ally occupation law," but preferred to leave the issue unresolved,
since,. according to the decision, the confiscations cannot "be attrib-
uted to" the F.R.G. in either case.' 22 The Court bolsters this some-
what conclusory statement by pointing out that the sovereignty of the
F.R.G. has always been limited to the territorial boundaries of the
former western occupation zones. That the takings were indisputably
prosecuted by German citizens, therefore, is immaterial, since the gov-
ernmental authority being exercised was not that of West Germany.
Equally irrelevant, in the Court's view, was the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that the confiscations took place within "Germany." According
to a famous line of prior constitutional decisions, 2 3 this "Germany"
had continued to exist after 1945 and was presumably still governed,
at least until 1949, by the Weimar Constitution, which contained its
own property guaranty. 24 The Court itself had declared, in a prior
120. Leisner, supra note 116, at 1570.
121. Id.
122. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(aa)(2). This reasoning seems to contradict the
Court's hitherto well-settled doctrine concerning the theoretical unity of "Germany" as defined
by the 1937 borders: "The clear legal position of every government of the Federal Republic has
been: the existence of this unitary 'Germany,' stipulated by and anchored in the Basic Law,
presupposing a pan-German state citizenry and a pan-German governmental authority." Judg-
ment of July 31, 1973, 36 BVerfGE 1, 19 (author's translation). See also infra note 124.
123. E.g., Judgment of May 7, 1953, 2 BVerfGE 266, 277; Judgment of Feb. 26, 1954, 3
BVerfGE 288, 319-20; Judgment of Aug. 17, 1956, 5 BVerfGE 85, 126; Judgment of Mar. 26,
1957, 6 BVerfGE 309, 338; Judgment of July 31, 1973, 36 BVerfGE 1, 15-16; See also GG arts.
23, 116.
124. The possiblity that the Court would hold the pre-1949 confiscations to have been viola-
tions of the property guaranty of the "Weimar Constitution" of 1919, and therefore incurably
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decision, that the F.R.G. "felt itself responsible for all of Germany,"
as demarcated by the pre-1937 borders.1 25 In light of the instant deci-
sion, however, it is difficult to determine what meaning, if any, this
doctrine ever had. In sum, the Court holds that even property takings
within Germany carried out entirely by Germans must be attributed
to a foreign "sovereignty" because such actions were later approved and
preserved through the authority and on the territory of the G.D.R. 126
The issue of possible F.R.G. responsibility arising out of its status
as "successor-in-interest" to the G.D.R. was raised by the Court in
oral arguments but not addressed in the opinion. Nevertheless, as
Leisner points out, well accepted principles of public international law
dictate that one nation state takes over the territory of another without
being bound by any legal strictures whatever, so that West Germany
was free to assume or deny any or all prior obligations incurred by the
East German government.1 27
2. Enforceability Within West Germany
With regard to the opinion's second premise, that the "land re-
form" laws could properly be enforced within the F.R.G., the Court
glosses over the subtleties of the argument in a disturbing way.
Leisner points out that article 6 of the German conflict of laws statute
("EGBGB") expressly prohibits application of foreign law where it is
fundamentally at odds with "basic principles of German law," such as
unconstitutional entirely apart from any consideration of the 1949 Basic Law, was broached by
Friedrich Fromme in Einheit und alte Rechte. Fromme, supra note 46.
125. In upholding the constitutionality of the F.R.G.'s Vertrag Ober die Grundlagen der
Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR of Dec. 21, 1972, the
Supreme Court held:
The Basic Law, not merely a thesis of public international law, assumes that Germany
(Das Deutsche Reich) survived the collapse of 1945, and that neither the capitulation nor the
exercise of foreign sovereignty by the Allied Occupation forces destroyed it; this is apparent
from the preamble as well as articles 16, 23, 116 and 146. This also conforms to the consis-
tent jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court, to which the panel today adheres.
The German Reich continues to exist and retains legal personality; it is nevertheless not
capable of acting because of its lack of institutional organization. The concepts of a pan-
German people, and of the pan-German state authority are also "anchored" in the Basic
Law.
The organization of the Federal Republic of Germany did not constitute erection of a
new German state, but rather the reorganization of part of Germany. The Federal Republic
is therefore not the "successor in interest" to Germany, but is rather identical with the state
of "Germany" - with reference to its territorial boundaries, however, partly identical....
[The F.R.G.] limits its sovereignty to the area subject to the Basic Law, but feels itself
responsible for all of Germany.... The German Democratic Republic belongs to Germany
and cannot be considered a foreign state in regard to the Federal Republic.
Judgment of July 31, 1973, 36 BVerfGE 1, 15-17 (1974) (citations ommitted) (author's
translation).
126. Leisner, supra note 116, at 1571.
127. Id.
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the basic rights set forth in the Constitution.1 28 In these situations,
enforcement of foreign law is considered violative of the German ordre
public. Although this argument was raised by the plaintiffs, the Court
failed to discuss it in a meaningful way, noting casually that the ordre
public forbids application of foreign law only in cases of a "current
and domestic injury." 129 The jurisprudence in this field is far richer
than the opinion indicates.
In fact, "black-letter law" is that foreign expropriations without
compensation are generally not recognized by German courts. 30 The
requirement that the confiscations have some domestic effect, i.e. that
actual harm result within the territorial boundaries of West Germany,
is usually gauged by reference to the citizenship of the complainant.' 3'
Yet here, the injured original property owners were all German citi-
zens, many of whom later became citizens of the F.R.G. Moreover,
the grosser the violation of German principles of justice, the less strin-
gently the "domestic effect" requirement is to be applied. 32
Despite the opinion's failure to address these important issues, the
result here is correct according to Leisner. The conflict-of-law provi-
sions of article 6 EGBGB must plainly yield to duly enacted provi-
sions of the Basic Law. Recognition and enforcement of foreign law
which facially violates the ordre public can be sanctioned by constitu-
tional amendment, as was the case with the "land-reform" measures
here at issue. If one agrees with the Court that "foreign sovereignty"
was here at work, the Court's holding that the German Parliament has
power to recognize foreign confiscations which violate the fundamen-
tal rights of West Germans, provided that such expropriations are
"constitutionalized" by appropriate amendments to the Basic Law, is
clearly correct.'
33
3. "Expropriation" or "Persecution?"
Despite the foregoing, the "Land Reform" decision does not con-
fer upon the legislative branch of government unlimited power to sus-
128. Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Internationalen Privatrechts, 1986 BGBI. I 1142, 1143
(amending Einftihrungsgesetz zum BUrgerlichen Gesetzbuche) reads: "The laws of a foreign
State shall not be applied when such application would lead to a result which is obviously and
fundamentally irreconcilable with basic principles of German law. Such laws are particularly
inapplicable when they are in conflict with the fundamental rights [enumerated in the Basic
Law]." (author's translation).
129. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(aa)(3).
130. Judgment of Apr. 28, 1988, BGH Ziv. Sen., 104 BGHZ 240, 244.
131. See Judgment of Nov. 20, 1958, BGH Ziv. Sen., 28 BGHZ 375.
132. Leisner, supra note 116, at 1571.
133. Id.
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pend rights whenever it can muster the majority needed to amend the
Basic Law. The opinion clearly sets forth the limits to parliamentary
power: the principle of basic human dignity as well as generally estab-
lished German human rights concepts "necessary to the preservation
of a decent social order." 1 34 Even amenders of the Basic Law must
observe "fundamental principles of justice, such as equality before the
law and the prohibition on arbitrary government action."' 35
Once the Court undertook to measure the constitutional amend-
ments which confirmed the 1945-49 expropriations against this de-
scription of the Article 79, section 3 yardstick, it should have
considered whether continued tolerance of the ownership structures
established by the "land reform" was itself a transgression of human
dignity and thus a violation of the human rights component of Article
14 expressly recognized in its jurisprudence. 136 The Court, however,
failed to do this in any organized manner. Instead, as Leisner notes,
the Court merely hints at its positions in scattered dicta, without un-
dertaking a systematic analysis. In response to the suggestion that de-
nial of restitution of title violated the human rights component of
Article 14, the Court remarks flatly that Article 79 requires no such
restitution. The obvious question of whether some minimal compen-
sation is at least due is not addressed by the opinion at all: rather, the
text tersely notes that "burden-sharing" (Lastenausgleich) payments
are sufficient, and that theoretically nothing prevents an owner from
buying the property back again. 137
More problematic, however, is the Court's response to the plain-
tiffs' urgently argued contention that "land reform" was merely the
most visible public expression of a campaign of persecution which it-
self constituted a severe violation of human rights and dignity. The
opinion records the plaintiffs' arguments that the expropriations were
conceived, not essentially as property law measures, but rather as a
means of serving the Marxist objective of the economic and physical
destruction of the "property owning class."' 138 The illegal confisca-
tions, they argued, were now simply the ossified remains of this arbi-
trary brutality, which branded them as "class enemies" of the
proletarian socialist revolution and reduced them to mere objects of
State power. The expropriation "proceedings," they claimed, violated
the same fundamental principles of justice and human rights which
134. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(a) (author's translation).
135. Id. (author's translation).
136. Id. at C II(2)(b)(cc)(3).
137. Id. at C II(2)(b)(cc)(2).
138. Id. at A IV(2)(a).
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the Court itself recognized as limits on the amendment power of the
legislature. Finally, they posed the question whether the takings in the
Soviet Zone were not in actuality "persecutorial confiscations," which,
according to established doctrine, differ from expropriations in that
they are principally aimed at the individual, rather than the property
being taken. 1
39
These allegations were neither contradicted by the defendant Bonn
government, nor treated or even mentioned in the opinion. We must
assume that they were rejected by the Court, which appeared to view
"land reform" purely in terms of routine "expropriation." The opin-
ion uses the word "confiscation" only once, within quotation marks
and without apparent reference to the indicia of persecution essential
to its character. 14° It is indeed questionable whether, in the wake of
this decision, the traditional concept of confiscation as "expropriation
motivated by desire to punish or harm an individual" retains validity
in German law. 1
41
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of the opinion is the Court's
failure to utter a single harsh word about the severe, often deadly,
persecutions to which property owners in the East were subjected.
Adopting a thoroughgoing relativism, it refers blandly to the "meas-
ures undertaken by German authorities which, in the opinion of the
F.R.G., are to be considered illegal and unconstitutional."' 142 It ap-
pears to attempt to justify the persecutions in an astonishing passage
claiming:
Our conclusion is undisturbed by the plaintiffs' objection that the takings
were part of a radical transformation of social relationships on the model
of a socialist order. It inheres in the character of such an order that little
or no compensation can be given: otherwise the intended social revolu-
tion is spoiled, 143
The Supreme Constitutional Court has historically been anything
but reticent in its condemnation of similar measures on the part of
Germany's Nazi regime, declaring them "void ab initio for their mani-
fest injustice, contradicting the first principles of the rule of law,"' 144
and judging the government's efforts "to destroy a group of citizens
based on racial criteria" to be irreconcilable with law and justice.145
139. See Leisner, supra note 116, at 1572 n.37 and accompanying text.
140. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(aa)(3).
141. Leisner, supra note 116, at 1573 (author's translation).
142. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(aa)(2) (author's translation).
143. Id. at C II(2)(b)(aa)(3) (author's translation).
144. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1955, GSZ, 16 BGHZ 350, 354 (author's translation).
145. Judgment of Feb. 14, 1968, 23 BVerfGE 98, 104 (author's translation).
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With regard to the horrible persecutions attending "land reform,"
however, the justices had nothing to say.
Leisner notes that an important principle for adjudicating constitu-
tionally guaranteed fundamental rights may be drawn from the
Court's disturbing silence on this point. It appears to make a material
difference under German law whether a group of individuals is perse-
cuted because of (a) its racial/religious characteristics, or (b) its social
class standing based on property ownership. 146 Expropriations attend-
ing a "class struggle" may be analyzed under general property law
principles, and, in doubtful cases, may be recognized and enforced in
Germany under the rubric "actions of a foreign sovereign." This prin-
ciple, of obvious application to Germany's asylum law, likewise indi-
cates that only minimal weight should be attached to the human rights
component of the property guaranty.
47
Given the assumption that the 1945-49 expropriations had no rela-
tion to "persecution," the "Land Reform" decision is internally con-
sistent. But it establishes principles regarding fundamental judgments
in property law cases which run diametrically counter to settled tenets
of German law. Although events such as "land reform" are not likely
to recur, the decision will certainly play a role whenever "transforma-
tions of the social order" are in question. Its effects on the future juris-
prudence of Germany are thus incalculable.
4. "Burden-Sharing Payments"
Once the Court determined that the Unity Treaty provisions rec-
ognizing "land reform" did not constitute a violation of the human
rights component of Article 14's property guaranty, the plaintiffs'
claims to "compensation" under property law were plainly in-
admissable. The litigants were left only with the possibility of "bur-
den-sharing" entitlements under the Court's war reparations
jurisprudence. 48 According to the Justices, any claims of this nature
arose solely out of the "value-system of the Basic Law, especially with
regard to the principle of the 'social State' expressed in Basic Law
Article 20." 149 The essential elements of the "social State" principle
are protected from amendment by Article 79, but, as Leisner notes,
the Court draws the government's obligation to provide some kind of
burden-sharing payment primarily from its consideration of the equal-
146. Leisner, supra note 116, at 1573.
147. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Judgment of Jan. 13, 1976, 41 BVerfGE 126 (discussing war reparations
jurisprudence).
149. Decision, supra note 5, at C II(2)(b)(cc)(l) (author's translation).
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ity principle.150 Since some form of compensation, in the broad, non-
technical sense, had been allocated to all other affected groups, the
Parliament could not deny minimal payment to "land reform"
victims.
The logic of the opinion here necessarily leads to an astounding,
though unstated, result: all legal provisions regarding restitution or
compensation for East German real property takings, whether they
occurred before or after 1949, are in essence "burden-sharing" regula-
tions.1 51 They cannot be deemed to create conventional property law
claims of the type arising out of expropriation. Yet, Leisner notes, the
Parliament which approved the Unity Treaty and its related legislative
acts plainly intended to, and understood itself to be, regulating expro-
priation claims.1 52 In its rush towards what many felt was a pre-deter-
mined result, the Court appears to have misapprehended the very
nature of this legislation. The only explanation which can be gleaned
from the opinion appears to be that
the Unity Treaty refused to recognize the post-1949 expropriations by
the 'foreign sovereignty' because they violated fundamental rights; the
drafters allowed article 6 EGBGB to protect the German ordre public in
the normal manner. In doing this they adequately fulfilled their respon-
sibilities regarding 'burden-sharing.' They were free, however, not to
grant restitution/compensation of this type to the victims of 'land
reform.'
1 5 3
Such is the tortuous logic required by the text.
Thus, according to the Court, once Parliament had granted such
restitution/compensation as "burden-sharing" to people whose land
was expropriated after 1949, it could not refuse "land reform" victims
any compensation whatsoever. According to the Court, denial of res-
titution/compensation was fully justified in light of the U.S.S.R.'s de-
mands, because noncompliance could have prevented unification. Yet,
as Leisner points out, nowhere in the pleadings of the Bonn or Berlin
governments does it appear that the Soviet Union voiced any objection
to compensation; indeed, the concept of compensation is itself predi-
cated on a valid expropriation, and it was precisely the validity of
"land reform" expropriations that Moscow insisted on preserving.
54
Nevertheless, the discrimination was upheld. The justices make plain
that a violation of the equality principle of Article 3 in property cases
is virtually impossible to establish; the Court's doctrine as set forth in
150. Id. at C 111(1).
151. Leisner, supra note 116, at 1573-74.
152. Id. at 1574-75.
153. Id. at 1574 (author's translation).
154. Id.
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this decision offers the legislature the broadest possible scope for dis-
crimination. The Court even suggests the "lengthy time period inter-
vening since the takings" as a reason for denying compensation to pre-
1949 expropriation victims. 155 The confident assertion of one German
newspaper headline: "Massive Injustice Cannot Become Justice by
Passage of Time,"' 1 6 appears to require some qualification under cur-
rent German law.
The emerging democracies of eastern Europe are said to be care-
fully observing Germany as a pioneer in the "marketization" of a so-
cialist command economy. The process, wherever it takes place, is
bound to entail societal disruption and a great deal of human suffering.
Despite the constraints of West Germany's unique history, there is
certainly much to emulate in that country's approach. Few observers,
however, would consider the "Land Reform" decision to have been
the Supreme Constitutional Court's finest hour. The opinion's effects
on asylum law, specifically on the relative weight to be accorded par-
ticular indicia of "persecution" necessary to support a claim, could be
profound. 1'7 The Court's acceptance of confiscatory measures as nec-
essary tools for "radical social transformation" sounds a dark note of
expediency in German constitutional adjudication, a note not unfamil-
iar to our twentieth century. It may be hoped that the opinion's Arti-
cle 14 jurisprudence will be classified more as a one-time response to a
unique and unrepeatable set of facts-as "coming to terms with the
past"-than as considered and purposeful development of constitu-
tional doctrine.
155. Decision, supra note 5, at C III(l)(a) (author's translation).
156. Kidger: Massenhaft begangenes Unrecht wird nicht durch ZeitablaufRecht, FAZ, Jan.
23, 1991, at 6 (quoting brief submitted by plaintiffs) (author's translation).
157. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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